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Abstract 
 
This paper aims at exploring the relationship between religiosity and electoral preferences in Portugal and 
Spain. More precisely, the capacity of religiosity (measured as attendance to religious services) to influence the 
probability of voting among the large national parties in both countries is examined. Previous work on the 
Spanish case has showed that this relationship has gained new ground in recent times: while the years following 
the consolidation of democracy were marked by the weakening of the religious cleavage, more recent general 
elections have coincided with the resurrection of what we have labelled as religious voting. In spite of the 
common Catholic denomination, the situation in Portugal is different. Religious landscapes in Portugal and 
Spain display important differences. These hold notwithstanding the imprints of the secularisation process, 
which in both countries has resulted in weaker religious feelings and lower church attendance rates. Contrary to 
our expectations, the results of a multivariate analysis of electoral surveys on Portugal and Spain point at a 
diverting pattern of relationship between religiosity and voting: whereas religiosity does not seem to be 
influencing the vote in Portugal, it is confirming at a powerful factor to explain electoral decisions in Spain.   
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This paper explores what we label as religious voting in Portugal and Spain. It aims at disentangling some 
puzzles regarding party competition in two countries that exhibit a number of remarkable similarities.  To begin 
with, Spain and Portugal are both essentially Catholic countries.  This should be taken to imply both a particular 
configuration of the country’s religious map, as well as the pre-eminence of an influential culture based on 
Catholic values and ideas.  Also, both countries have seen their politics deeply interwoven with religion at 
crucial historical junctures.  Paraphrasing Juan Linz’s (1993: 1) dictum, in the 20th century the somewhat 
parallel history of religion in Portugal and Spain is certainly full of dramatic events.  In both countries, the 
outburst of authoritarian ruling in the 1930s was grounded – among on other things – in a deeply entrenched 
conflict around clericalism. And, in both, the architects of the new democratic regimes in the 1970s faced a long 
list of unresolved religious issues with the potential of shattering the new democratic order into pieces.  Lastly, 
in both countries the conflict around religious issues seems to be gaining new momentum -- notably, over the 
issues of religious education or gay marriage in Spain, or the controversies over abortion and the placing of 
crucifixes in public schools in Portugal.  
 
To what extent does a common Catholic culture lead to commonalities in the ways religiosity links up with 
political behaviour?  After the longest period of democratic policy making in the Iberian Peninsula, and in a 
context of a seemingly unstoppable process of secularization, is still religiosity a factor that shapes the electoral 
fortunes of major political parties? From the perspective of the relationship between religiosity and party 
choice, in what ways are Spain and Portugal different?  More generally, in observing the interweaving of 
religiosity and political behaviour in two Catholic countries, what are the lessons to be drown for the 
understanding of religious voting in European democracies?   
 
We argue that, despite a shared tradition and a common history, the relationship between religiosity and 
politics is taking different shapes in Portugal and Spain.  The results of a multivariate analysis of postelectoral 
survey data in both countries reveals that the strength of the relationship is not even between the two cases: it is 
stronger in Spain than in Portugal.  Also, we defend that to understand the bearing of religiosity on voting in 
Spain, a closer look at the interacting effects between religiosity, ideology, and voting needs to be carried out. 
That, however, is not necessary in the case of Portugal, where the effect of religious identities on voting is 
apparently not significantly mediated by ideology.     
 
We organise the paper as follows. In the first place, some paradoxes coming from the theoretical treatment 
assigned to religion in most standard accounts of voting are considered. If religiosity is on the verge of 
disappearing due to the secularisation process, how the persistence of the religious factor in many western 
European countries can be explained?  Secondly, the religious maps of Spain and Portugal are sketched. 
Thirdly, the specification of the model is briefly discussed. Fourthly, the results of the “full” model composed 
for the four surveys are examined.  This is meant to discuss the magnitude of the direct effects of religiosity on 
the vote.  Fifthly, we move to the discussion of the indirect effects, considering in this section the bearing of 
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religious value orientations on ideological identities.  Sixthly, an explanation for the differences between the 
two cases is presented.  Lastly, we conclude.   
 
 
Religious cleavage versus religious voting 
 
The attention paid to the religious cleavage has been uneven, to say the least.  Of course, the “State-Church 
cleavage” was among the few Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 50 ff.) privileged as the ones becoming frozen after the 
crystallisation of mass politics in the inter-war years.  But after their seminal work, the religious cleavage has 
merited only sporadic interest, and even then, it has largely been the object of sweeping generalisations that 
have done little to clarify issues of causality (Knutsen 1995: 463).  In any case, it has received far less attention 
than the class cleavage.  In contrast to the alleged ubiquity of class conflicts, the religious cleavage has often 
wrongly been assumed to be limited to the few cases in which confessional parties occasionally compete with 
class-based parties, and/or in which serious conflicts have sometimes broken out for religious reasons lato 
sensu. But this obviously is far from true: in many countries, religious conflicts exist in the absence of 
confessional parties. Moreover, the scarce attention addressed to the religious cleavage contradicted its apparent 
relevance in many comparative analyses undertaken in the 1970s (Converse 1974: 733-734; Lijphart 1971: 7-8; 
1980: 287; Rose and Urwin 1969: 12).   
 
The standard accounts of the religious cleavage in the New Politics of the 1980s and afterwards revolved 
around the framework of “decay”: if for some the religious cleavage has, as a minimum, been dramatically 
reduced, for others the presence of religious factors in the voting choice has vaporised. As stated for instance by 
Franklin, Mackie, et al. (1992: 40), “the decline in the political saliency of religion should certainly have hurt 
the electoral prospect of religious parties, and may also have hurt right wing parties in general”. This decline 
reaches the apex in many empirical analyses of voting behaviour, where religious variables are simply not taken 
into consideration and thus not included in any of their otherwise extremely sophisticated statistical models 
aiming at explaining voters’ choices. As summarised again by Franklin (1992: 404), “social cleavages had … 
finally become irrelevant to partisanship …”. 
 
Thanks to the rise of theories pointing to the weakening of social cleavages in Western Europe, the 
intensifying processes of partisan dealignments, and their combined effects on electoral change (Dalton, 
Flanagan, and Beck 1984), the analysis of religiosity gained again new momentum in the mid-1990s (Dalton 
1996: 331).   Paradoxically, the new interest in religious voting emerged from the confirmation of the limits of 
the secularization argument.  For one, secularization seems to adopt context-specific meanings, implying 
distinctive social and political processes in different countries.  Likewise, the rise of new form of religious 
fundamentalism, and the resurgence of political conflicts around a number of “religious-issues” compose a 
scenario where religious divisions retain a potential for divisions at the level of politics.   
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We claim in this paper that, in spite of the alleged decline of the religious cleavage, in many Western 
European countries there is a religious voting.  Religiosity is surely lessening its political significance and has 
consequently much lower impact on voting.  Party leaders, building strategically on the outcomes of 
secularisation and social change processes, as well as on increasing levels of education and information, have 
decided to maximise their electoral appeals by downplaying the conflictive ladders of religious divisions. In 
most countries dominated by only one denomination, leaders of both confessional and secular parties have come 
to accept neither to incorporate religious conflicts back into the political agenda, nor to mobilise voters with 
religious or anti-religious flags in electoral contests. Yet, religiosity appears as a relevant variable for explaining 
voting in a number of countries (Calvo and Montero 2002; Kotler-Berkowitz 2002). This variable has different 
doses of explanatory power and shows also distinctive relationships with other independent variables, 
depending upon the contingent combination of the social, cultural, and political features of a given country. But 
it does matter. In other words, despite the fact that society might be less religious as a whole, those that remain 
religious are growing politically committed, developing intense preferences in a broad spectrum of issues 
connected with social and political life. Moreover, in some other countries a growing number of indicators point 
at a renewed radicalisation of those segments of society that resist secularization. To the extent that these two 
different religious situations can impinge on voting choices, the case for further attention to religious voting is 
clearly a pressing one.   
 
Religious voting implies some type of systematic association between religiosity and vote in a number of 
citizens. In this sense, it is roughly equivalent to class voting, or ethnic voting, or race voting. Take, for 
instance, the first. If we substitute class by the pertinent indicator of religiosity, the concept of religious voting 
is immediately apparent in the definition of class voting provided by Evans (2000: 401). In his terms, “at first 
glance, the idea of class [religious] voting appears straightforward. It refers to the tendency for voters in a 
particular class [denomination, or level of religiosity] to vote for a specific party, political candidate (or 
groupings of these), rather than an alternative option, compared with voters of another class or classes 
[denominations, or levels of religiosity]. In other words, class [religious] voting describes a pattern of 
association between class [religiosity] and vote”.  In this sense, religious voting seems intuitively to be less 
strong than the religious cleavage. But the repeated existence of a clear connection between some relevant 
empirical indicators of religiosity, on the one hand, and voting for a given party, on the other, needs to be 
explained by a research strategy other than the non-inclusion of religious variables in models of electoral 
behaviour.  
 
 
Religious maps compared 
 
Very broadly, the Portuguese are more religious than their Spanish counterparts.  According with recent data 
from the European Social Survey (ESS), if in Spain the percentage of those belonging to a religion has 
descended to 75 per cent of the population, in Portugal the figure remains at an overwhelming 86 percent, the 
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third highest in Europe.1  This suggests that the secularization process has been met differently in the two 
Iberian countries, an impression that is confirmed by the examination of further indicators of religiosity.2  For 
instance, Table 1 reports a classification of European countries according to their average level of subjective 
religiosity.  The contrasts are apparent: whereas Portugal belongs to the group of highly religious societies 
(formed by Greece, Poland, Italy, and Ireland), Spain displays levels along the lines of the more secularized 
societies.  The indicators assembled in Table 2 further confirm that Portugal is more religious a country than 
Spain.  Just to mention a few, note that while in 1999 82 percent of Portuguese respondents considered 
themselves religious, only 56 percent affirmed so in Spain.  Religion seems to be much more important for the 
lives of the Portuguese: the gap between the two countries as far as the capacity of religion to bring comfort and 
strength is an astonishing 27 percentage points.  Lastly, remarkable differences can be found in relation to the 
public role attributed to the Church.  If on the whole Spaniards seem reluctant to define the Church as a 
trustworthy institution, the Portuguese trust their Church firmly, capable of satisfying the people’s spiritual 
needs.   
 
Tables 1 and 2 about here 
 
Contrasting the levels of religious practice will also contribute to set out the differences in the religious map 
in the two countries compared.  Not only is Portugal more devout a country than Spain: it also exhibits rates of 
religious practice that outmarch virtually any other in Europe.  Among the Catholic countries, only the Polish, 
Irish, and Italians go to church more frequently (Table 3).  Spain, in contrast, appears at the bottom of the list of 
Catholic countries.  It is noteworthy that, with the new picture, important dissimilarities emerge among 
European confessions.  While a sizeable segment of the population in Catholic countries is still willing to 
comply with the mandates of their religion, the rates of religious practice have dramatically dropped in 
countries with Protestant or Lutheran majorities.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
In short, Portugal is more religious a country than Spain.  The data presented in this section define 
Portuguese citizens as clearly more faithful and more eager to participate in religious services than their Spanish 
peers.  To what extent does this distinctiveness lead to differences in the relationship between religiosity and 
electoral behaviour?  In the following section we will present the results of a multivariate analysis with party 
                                                          
1 European Social Survey (2002-2003) [ESS]; Questions C9 and C10.  Of course, Catholicism is by far the religion that the 
majority declares to belong to in both countries: 97 percent of those belonging to a religious defined themselves as Roman 
Catholics in Spain and Portugal alike.  Only in Italy and Poland (99 percent) we find a higher proportion of Catholics.  See 
Calvo and Montero (2005).  
 
2 Religiosity is a multi-faceted phenomenon that consists of three easily identifiable dimensions: belonging (also called 
“denomination”), beliefs, and behaviour, or, religious practice (Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere 1995).  Focusing on each of the 
different dimensions largely depends on the particular object of research, as well as on the available data.   Note, however, 
that we do not agree with Knutsen (2004), who uses religious denomination to asses the impact of religiosity on party choice 
in eight western European countries.   Denomination has been proved to be only a cultural element, incapable of stirring 
differences among voters that could end up with discernible voting patterns.  
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choice as the dependent variable, and religiosity, measured as church attendance, as the main independent 
factor.  Whether or not this relationship adopts a similar outlook in both countries will be the prime aim of this 
effort.   
 
 
Model specification 
 
We have considered two general elections for each country: on the one hand, the most recent general elections 
in Spain (2004), and the last Portuguese legislative election with a post electoral study available (Portugal-2002) 
and, on the other hand, the first elections organized after the successful completion of the transition period 
(Spain-1982; Portugal-1983).3  We seek to find out now whether the strength of religious voting has changed 
across time, and, if so, whether it has changed differently in Portugal and Spain.  A logistic regression model 
has been assembled for the four surveys. Because small sample sizes badly affect the efficacy of these models 
for the smaller parties, we have opted for concentrating on the two large parties in each country.  These are the 
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE, Socialdemocrat) and Alianza Popular and later Partido Popular 
(AP-PP, conservative) in Spain, and the Partido Socialista (PS, Socialdemocrat) and Partido Social Democrata 
(PSD, conservative).   Considering this, the dependent variable takes value 1 when the respondents have voted 
for any of the two large parties, and value 0 when they have voted for any other party in the opposed ideological 
direction.  Accordingly, in explaining the vote for, say, the PSOE, Izquierda Unida (IU) voters – generally 
located further at the left - are not included in value 0 of the variable; likewise, nationalist voters –often situated 
further to the right of the PP - are not included in value 0 in the models for AP-PP.  Of course, this applies as 
well to the Portuguese case: when discussing the vote for the PS, Bloco de Esquerda and Partido Comunista 
Português (PCP) voters will not be included in value 0, while Centro Democrático Social (CDS) voters are 
excluded in the models for the PSD.    
 
Religiosity is our key independent variable.  Following the standard indicator in the literature (see 
Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere 1995), we use church attendance – i.e., religious practice – to measure individual 
religiosity.  This is possible for Spain-2004 and for the two Portuguese studies.4  As for Spain-1982, the model 
includes a mixed indicator of practice and identity, where respondents are asked to locate themselves in a 6-
points scale where feeling “very good catholic” ranks in one extreme, and feeling “an atheist” dwells at the 
other; the intermediate values use religious practice to define different intensities of religious commitment.  In 
                                                          
3 For Portugal-1983, we have used the data from the Four Nation Study (“The Political Culture of Southern Europe: A Four 
Nation Study"), hold in the data bank of the Spanish Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS).  The Portuguese survey 
(CIS study # 1.459) has a sample of N= 2,000.  For Spain-1982 we have used the post-electoral survey run by DATA 
(N=5,463). As for Portugal-2002, data come from the postelectoral survey undertaken by the Instituto de Ciências Sociais 
(ICS), Universidade de Lisboa (N=1,303).  Lastly, for Spain-2004, the TNS/Demoscopia postelectoral survey has been 
employed (N=2,929).  The limitations of this latter survey should not be concealed.  First and foremost, PP vote is clearly 
underrepresented.  For reasons that are still unclear, a large part of PP voters do not manifest this option before the pollster. 
4 Note that religious practice correlates very highly with the more direct measures of the religious phenomenon, such as 
religious beliefs as well as subjective evaluations of religious commitment.   
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order to enhance the efficiency of the models, we have ungrouped the variable, introducing it in dummy format.  
Also following the standard recommendations, we have selected as the reference category (RC) a group that is 
large in size and meaningful in relation to the dependent variable (Hardy 1993: 10).  Thus, the item “never 
attending to religious services” is taken as the reference category in the cases of Spain-2004 and Portugal-2003.  
For Spain-1982, however, the comparison group – thus omitted from the model – is being “a not very practising 
catholic”.  Lastly, the item of attending to church “two times per month” is the reference category in the case of 
Portugal-1983.  In interpreting the results, we must think about the significance of the transit from the reference 
category to any other religious category, thus having to focus the attention both to the direction of the 
coefficients as well as the level of significance.  
 
We also seek to asses the bearing of morality on voting choices.  While moral views have been traditionally 
associated with religiosity, the transformations in the religious phenomenon brought about by the secularization 
process are casting new doubts as to whether or not moral divisions still reflect religious ones. But the scarce 
attention paid to the electoral consequences of societal moral divides is striking, as it is as well the voting 
preferences of moral conservatives and moral liberals.  For these reasons, a variable measuring attitudes 
towards abortion has been included in the models for Spain-1982 and 2004, and Portugal-2003.  To the best of 
our knowledge, no such variable can be found in electoral studies in Portugal during the 1980s.  It is important 
to note that the construction of this indicator varies. For Spain-1982, we have employed a variable measuring 
the attitudes towards abortion, but in a very specific situation: namely, when pregnancy could cause fatal 
damage either to the mother or to the baby herself.  However, for Spain-2004 and Portugal-2003 the indicator 
reports attitudes towards “abortion on demand” (in both cases a scale ranging from value 1 to value 10). Moral 
evaluations are space and time-bounded. What appears perfectly acceptable now was the subject of much moral 
hazard in the past.  At the beginning of the 1980s, abortion on demand was simply not a possibility either in 
Spain or in Portugal. Even more, women taking clandestine abortion and physicians helping them could be by 
law criminally prosecuted, and many of them were indeed prosecuted and sentenced to jail. As a maximum, the 
debate revolved then around the justification of some scenarios where the general ban on abortion could be 
specifically lifted. At present time, however, the discussion is on whether or not women should have the right to 
abort freely, regardless the concurrence of extenuating circumstances (rape, risk of malformations, or physical 
and mental illnesses).  
 
As for the list of political and social controls, two important political variables as ideology and leadership 
evaluation escort religious practice in the models.  Whether or not candidates count on voters’ support has 
proved to be a decisive explanation for party choice. Particularly in the case of catch-all parties, previous work 
shows that a positive evaluation of candidates increases the odds of supporting the party he or she represents 
(Gunther and Montero 2001: 129-131; Costa Lobo 2002).  As for ideology, a wealth of previous work has 
identified the self-positioning in the ideological scale as the best predictor of the vote in Spain and Portugal 
alike (Torcal and Medina 2002; Gunther and Montero 2001; Sánchez-Cuenca 2003).  Although the role of 
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ideology in predicting party choice is not as stronger in Portugal, it still appears as a formidable variable with 
ample capacity to explain electoral preferences (Freire 2001). 
 
Ideology is a particularly sensitive topic in any discussion of religiosity and electoral behaviour.  Because it 
occurs causally later than most of the independent variables included in conventional regression models, it very 
often robes much of the effect of some independent variables on the vote.  This has been documented to take 
place, for instance, in the case of class voting; in that case, ideology assumes a great deal of the direct effect of 
social class on party choice (Bartle 1998).  Class, however, exerts an indirect, yet powerful still, effect on 
voting (Evans 1999; García de Polavieja 2001).  Of course failing to acknowledge the distinction between direct 
and indirect effects can give way to misleading interpretations of the results. Particularly in those cases where 
religious identities are strongly correlated with ideological positions, the effect of ideology can lead us to 
believe that religiosity is not influential when, in reality, it is so (Calvo and Montero 2002).  Precisely as a way 
to highlight the disruptive effect of ideology, we will show the models in a twofold format: firstly with ideology 
included (“full model” henceforth), then without.5  Also, ideology, this time as a dependent variable, will be 
regressed on a number of variables, including religiosity. With that we hope to demonstrate that the individual 
location in the left-right scale has much to do with his or her religiosity.  
 
The following equations summarize our models:   
 
SPAIN 
Equation (1) Y(Voto PSOE1982) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Abortion1 
Ideology, Gonzalez’sTher, control variables, İ). 
Equation (2) Y(Voto AP1982) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Abortion1 
Ideology, Fraga’sTher, control variables, İ). 
Equation (3) Y(Voto PSOE2004) =  f(Attendance2, Attendance 3, Attendance4, Attendance5, 
Attendance6, Abortion1, Ideology, Zapatero’sTher, EconomicPerform, control variables, İ). 
Equation (4) Y(Voto PP2004) =  f(Attendance2, Attendance 3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Abortion1 
Attendance6, Attendance7, Ideology, Rajoy’sTher, EconomicPerform, control variables, İ). 
 
PORTUGAL 
Equation (5) Y(Voto PS1983) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Ideology, 
Soares’Ther, control variables, İ). 
Equation (6) Y(Voto PSD1983) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Ideology, 
Machete’sTher, control variables, İ). 
Equation (7) Y(Voto PS2002) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Attendance6, 
Abortion1 deology, Rodrigues’Ther, control variables, İ). 
                                                          
5 The models also include a number of control variables. These are evaluation of economic performance (for Spain-1982 and 
2004 and for Portugal-2002), occupational status, family income, education, age, gender, and community size.  
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Equation (8) Y(Voto PSD2002) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5 Attendance6, 
Abortion1 Ideology, Barroso’sTher, GovernmentPerform, control variables, İ). 
 
 
Religiosity and party support: observing direct effects 
 
As we introduced before, not every explanatory variable occurs at the same causal moment (Bartle 1998: 501-
502).  Some of them, notably political variables such as ideology or party attachment, take shape “later” than 
the so-called structural variables (class, religiosity) or the socio-demographic ones (age, gender, etc). This can 
create a great deal of problems.  In many occasions, intermediate political variables “suck” the explanatory 
power of a number of variables that occur causally at an earlier stage, making the observer believe that there are 
not causal effects when, perhaps, they actually exist.  According to this basic argument, a distinction must be 
operated between the direct, and the indirect effects of any given factor on the chosen dependent variable(s). A 
variable’s total effect is thus composed of the sum of direct and indirect effects.  “Full” models, including 
ideology as a control variable, are discussed in this section.  Thus, the discussion will revolve around the 
magnitude of the direct effects of religiosity on party choice.  Clearly, the expectation is that religiosity 
performs worse in the full models than in scenarios where the disruptive effect of ideology is eliminated; these 
indirect effects will be addressed later.  
 
We begin with the models for Spain-1982 (Model A columns in Table 4). In line with previous findings 
(Montero and Calvo 2000: 125), we find a religious voting of moderate strength for the PSOE in the context of 
the 1982 general elections. The observation of the second column of Table 4 shows that the transit from being a 
“not a very practising Catholic” (the reference category) to the two categories of highest religiosity was 
statistically significant, and in the correct direction.  According to the expectations, stepping up in the religious 
scale jeopardized the odds of PSOE voting in 1982.  But the same cannot be said as to the transits towards 
categories of lower religiosity.  Particularly notorious is the transit towards atheism, which does not take the 
expected direction (and is only mildly statistically significant).6  So, at the beginning of the 1980s, and in the 
context of a particularly distinctive electoral race (Linz and Montero 1986), what Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere 
(1995) termed “Church integration” operated as a deterrent of socialist support.  What about the bearing of 
moral views on voting?  In the case of PSOE voting in 1982, whether or not the respondent justifies a restricted 
legalization of abortion (the hot topic at a time when “abortion on demand” was clearly not an issue) does not 
seem to exert an autonomous effect on party choice. While the direction of the coefficient suggests that PSOE 
voters tended to hold permissive moral views, the variable has no statistically significant effect.  As we will see 
                                                          
6 We have attempted to improve the model specification displayed in a previous analysis of the same election (Montero and 
Calvo 2000: Table 8.4). Apart from the inclusion of the abortion variable, the variable “occupational status” distinguishes 
now between “employed”, “unemployed”, “retired”, “student”, and “housewife” (“self-employed” being the reference 
category).  “Trade union membership” has been eliminated; in contrast, “income” is now in our models.  Finally, instead of in 
the continuous format, “education” and “age” have been fragmented into dummy variables.  Thanks to these changes, the 
overall R2 for the PSOE model has improved from 0.41 (N=1,346) to 0.46 (N=962); 85.86 percent of the cases have been 
now correctly classified. As for AP vote, the overall explanatory power of the model remains largely the same (0.72 to 0.70).  
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right now, this stands in contrast with the case of AP voting in that same year, when the abortion variable was 
significant.7  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Moving now to AP voting in 1982, it must be noted that, like in the case of the PSOE, a change in the 
reference category has revealed some aspects in the relationship between religiosity and conservative voting 
that were not obvious in our previous research (see Montero and Calvo 2000).8  Most interesting of all is the 
certain symmetry that we have found between the models for this Spanish election.  The model for the PSOE 
tells the story of those that were more determined to resist the wave of socialist support that swept the Spanish 
electorate in 1982: religious people appeared less eager to opt for the PSOE than any other social group.9  A 
similar argument applies to the case of AP voting: while no clear orientations are found as to whether or not 
religiosity determined party support, the model helps to identify those that would be hardly ready to vote for 
this political party.  Observing the third column of Table 4, the transit from the reference category to two of the 
less religious categories is statistically significant and in the correct direction.  Non-religious people did not like 
AP in closely the same way that religious people were wary of the PSOE. However, the transit towards the 
highest religious categories did not look determinant for the prospects of AP support.  Moreover, finding a 
negative coefficient in the transit towards the highest religious category is perplexing, to say the least.   
 
Sticking to a principled condemnation of abortion was beneficial for AP voting. These results introduced 
one of the defining features of Spanish politics as far the issue of morality is concerned: while the right 
galvanises the support of the morally conservative, the left seems unable to do so.  Conservative voting attracts 
a relatively much higher share among moral conservatives than leftist voting does in its quest to garner the 
support of moral liberals.  Interestingly, moral liberals seem to be more flexible at the time of casting the vote, 
displaying an observable tendency towards supporting several political parties, including those towards the left 
of large social democratic parties, i.e., the Communist party, or Izquierda Unida (its new organizational format 
since 1986).    
 
In short, at the level of direct effects, we have found a mild, but important, effect of religion on the vote in 
Spain-1982.  Religiosity seems to be linked with a form of “negative voting”.  In other words, if religiosity was 
not strong enough to determine the vote, it, however, showed a capacity to set limits in the range of plausible 
alternatives.  Let us move to the models for Portugal-1983 (Model A columns in Table 5).  The probability of 
                                                          
7 In this model, both income and education demonstrate a high predictive capacity for PSOE voting (higher levels in both 
variables representing a deterrent of PSOE support).  
 
8 There, the reference category was “attending to church every Sunday”.  
9 Of course this does not mean that all religious people, at the time close to 35 per cent of the population, voted conservative.  
In the 1982 “earthquake” electoral context, the PSOE swept the board virtually in every constituency considered.  What we 
claim is that religious people were among the more immune to an otherwise overwhelmingly powerful trend. 
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voting for the PS (against the probability of voting for any other party further to its right) was not very much 
affected by religiosity in the 1983 context.  Meeting the expectations, the coefficients organize a scenario where 
PS voters tend to be less religious than those voting for rights parties.  However, the effect is not strong in terms 
of statistical significance, as only the transit from the comparison group to the least religious category is 
statistically significant (and only at the confidence level of 90 per cent). In contrast, climbing up the religious 
ladder increased the odds of PSD voting in 1983, as the significance of the transits from the reference category 
towards the highest religious categories demonstrates. This relationship, however, is not a robust one.  While 
higher levels of religiosity favoured the electoral fortunes of these parties, the model also tells that a decreasing 
religiosity might also help the PSD vis-à-vis any other party towards its left.  These latter transits are not 
statistically significant; still, the surprising direction of the coefficients makes us suspect that something is 
distorting the effect of religiosity on this kind of voting.   
 
Table 5 about here 
 
In any case, the overall explanatory capacity of the model is constrained in the Portuguese case, particularly 
as far as PSD voting is concerned. In both countries, religiosity failed to bring about strong consequences on 
voting choices during the early 1980s.  Neither in Portugal, nor in Spain electoral competition revolved around 
religiosity for reasons either contextual or structural.  While in Spain the relevance of religiosity was 
overshadowed by the ability of the PSOE to receive a sort of universal vote in the extremely realigning and 
volatile 1982 elections (Linz and Montero 1986; Gunther and Montero 2001: 121-122), in Portugal voters of 
every religious group made roughly similar choices between the two larger parties (Bacalhau 1994: 65 ff). 
Religious identities did not lead to strong electoral alignments, and hence the competition to gain the specific 
support of religious constituencies was not stiff.  Notwithstanding this, we have found meaningful differences 
between the two cases compared.  If in Spain religiosity showed some capacity to set limits on the plausible 
alternatives of voter, in Portugal, religiosity was simply unimportant as a predictor of voting decisions.  We will 
comment further on these differences in the last section of the paper.  
 
Let us move now to the most recent elections with post-electoral surveys available: namely, Spain-2004 and 
Portugal-2002 (Model A columns in Tables 6 and 7). A highly significant religious variable commands a model 
for PP-vote – then the incumbent party - that shows great efficacy in explaining the probability of voting for this 
party. Even when controlled by ideology, virtually every religious category shows an autonomous effect on the 
dependent variable.10  Of course, this invites further questioning as to what has changed in the context of 
conservative voting in Spain, which explains such a remarkable transformation in the salience of the religious 
variable.  What has not changed is the strong effect of moral views on conservative voting in Spain.  In 2004, as 
in 1982, holding negative views about the legalization of abortion increases the likelihood of PP voting.  Moral 
                                                          
10 Note that in these elections, the RC is the lowest religious category.  
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conservatives, who happen to be the most religious, persist in their loyal support to the right.11  Yet the same 
does not hold true in the other side of the continuum: replicating the situation at the beginning of the 1980s, the 
PSOE still fails to conquer the minds of the moral liberals.  In contrast with the notorious influence of religion 
on the vote for the PP in 2004, the decision to choose the PSOE vis-à-vis any other electoral choice further to its 
right seems to have a weak religious component.  Considering the full model, the data presented in Table 6 
confirms the existence of only a mild relationship between religiosity and PSOE vote (only one transit is 
statistically significant). As a matter of fact, PSOE voting is better explained by looking at other variables, such 
as the assessment of the economy, which is again highly significant, or, of course, ideology.  Similarly, income 
is negatively related with this kind of vote, and so education is; higher educational status lead voters towards 
more conservative orientations.     
 
Tables  6 and 7 about here 
 
In sharp contrast, a quick perusal at the results of Table 7 confirms that, in contemporary Portugal, 
religiosity continues to be a weak predictor of the vote.   At least when the question is why Portuguese citizens 
opt among the two largest political parties, in a context of a party system that is more fragmented than the 
Spanish one, the answer still is not to be found within the confined of societal religious divides.  While in Spain 
the PP and the PSOE have electoral constituencies more or less well defined in religious terms, (something that, 
undoubtedly, impinges on policy making), in Portugal none of the religious categories show any statistical 
significance. Both PSD and PS voting appear immune to the bearing of religiosity, composing a picture where 
religiosity has lost any capacity for shaping the electoral preferences of Portuguese voters.  Equally relevant, but 
perhaps not that surprising, is the confirmation that moral views are neither able to predict the vote for the two 
largest parties in Portugal.  Neither the PS, nor the PSD are garnering the support of the moral liberals.  In fact, 
both parties compete for the support of the conservatives, who happen to outclass moral liberals in 
contemporary Portugal.  Thus, morality, as religiosity, does not organize the competition among the two main 
Portuguese political parties.  Both issues matter, but as a way to organize the voting decision between large, 
centrist political parties (as PS or PSD), and the smaller, more extreme-oriented ones (as Bloco on the left and 
CDS on the right).   
 
 
Religiosity and party support: two strategies for measuring indirect effects 
 
Religiosity is a textbook example of a variable apparently incapable of bring about direct effects.  Being so 
closely related with key political controls, such as ideology (see below), it often gives the impression of being 
unimportant, when it is not so.  Conscious of the potential magnitude of this problem (see Montero and Calvo 
                                                          
11 Economic performance, gender, and, of course, ideology, and Rajoy’s evaluation contribute also to explain the decision of 
voting for the PP in 2004.  Given that in 2004 the PP was the incumbent party, positive evaluations of the economy 
reinforced the tendency of supporting the continuity of the government.  
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2000), we have devised a twofold strategy to reveal the indirect effects of religiosity on voting that remained, 
perhaps, hidden in the discussion of direct effects. Firstly, we proceed with a simple exercise that consists of 
deleting ideology from Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7.  If the indirect effects hypothesis holds, we should witness 
noticeable changes in the behaviour of the religious categories as soon as ideology is expelled from the models.  
Naturally, our interpretation goes in the direction of insisting on the changes produced by this action in the other 
explanatory variables.  We do not consider whether or not the models perform better or worse as a whole.  
These results are offered in the Model B columns in Tables 4 (Spain-1982), 5 (Portugal-1983), 6 (Spain-2004) 
and 7 (Porgual-2002). Secondly, a linear regression model has been assembled to explain ideology (Table 8). 
From a certain theoretical standpoint, ideology is understood as a composite variable that summarizes a number 
of individual’s characteristics (Knutsen 1995, 1997, 1998).  It is expected that the more religiosity translates 
into ideological positions, the lower its capacity to exert direct effects.  Thus, our chief aim is to find out 
whether being “leftist” or “rightists”, is connected with the values of the respondent (or, alternatively, whether 
ideology depends on other factors).    
 
What happens if ideology is not included in the models as a political control? For one, the models collapse. 
Given the proven strength of ideological voting in both countries (Gunther and Montero 2001), it is not 
surprising that the overall explanatory capacity of the models drops as a consequence of this decision. Indeed, 
the R2 falls dramatically in the Spanish and the Portuguese surveys alike.  Nevertheless, it is the impact on the 
significance of the independent variables what should interest us now.  As for Spain-1982, as soon as ideology 
departs, religiosity is recuperated as an important predictor of PSOE voting (Table 4).  Without ideology, 
religiosity gains new strength to explain not only negative voting preferences, as we saw before, but also 
positive ones.  For instance, the transit from the comparison group towards the less religious categories becomes 
significant, confirming that a decreasing religiosity helped PSOE voting in 1982, but only when translated into 
leftist ideological positions.  Equally significant is the transformation in the model for AP in the same year: 
without ideology, religiosity emerges as a very powerful predictor of its vote, satisfying the expectation of AP 
as the natural destination of religious voters (and an unlikely one for non-religious). In the case of Portugal, 
however, no indirect effects of similar magnitude are revealed (Table 5).  Despite the positive consequences of 
the elimination of ideology on the significance of some factors – occupation and even religiosity itself for the 
PS -, the results as to the bearing of religiosity do not change very dramatically.  Particularly surprising is the 
limited effect in the significance of the religious variable in the vote for the PSD.  Being ideology expelled, the 
coefficients do take now the expected direction.  Also, the transit from the reference category to the highest 
religious category gains in statistical health.  However, scaling down in the level of religious commitment 
continues to be unimportant as regards PSD voting.   
 
As for Spain-2004, the elimination of ideology still stirs spectacular consequences on the performance of 
religious categories (Table 6).  Note for instance the significance, at the highest level, of every religious 
category in the explanation of PP voting.  Also, abortion seems to be gaining new vigour as political controls 
are temporarily eliminated.  All this confirms that the interweaving of religious and ideological identities is, at 
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least in the case of conservative voters, a defining feature of the Spanish politics.  Conservative voting has a 
distinctive religious element that, however, often fails to shine in due regard as it takes the face of conservative 
ideological positions.  Leftist voters, on the contrary, are coming to display a less cohesive religious profile.  
The results presented in Table 6 confirm that, in the case of PSOE voting, the problem of hidden effects has 
softened somehow with the passing of time.  While the departure of ideology clearly benefits the performance 
of religion as a factor to explain PSOE vote, the variable fails to acquire a profile as a good predictor of this 
kind of voting.  In any case, if ideology is not present in the models, higher levels of religiosity decrease the 
likelihood of PSOE voting.  This is a statistically significant effect.  
 
Does the elimination of ideology transform the role of religiosity in the explanation of voting choices in 
Portugal-2002?  The answer goes clearly in the negative. The striking continuity in the (reduced) significance of 
the religious variables after eliminating religiosity applies to religion and morality alike.  Thus, we must 
conclude that the absence of discernible direct effects of religiosity on the vote in Portugal is substantive, rather 
than technical.  While in Spain there are reasons to believe that religiosity matters, but through the definition of 
ideological identities that, in turn, shape voting choices, in Portugal the story is a different one: at least as far as 
the vote for the largest parties is considered, religiosity is simply not a factor anchoring this type of vote. 
 
Having completed half of the task, we proceed now with the second strategy introduced at the beginning of 
the section.  Table 8 shows the result of a model where ideology is regressed on a number of variables: namely, 
the respondent’s recollection of his or her mother’s ideology, church attendance (again in dummy format), 
gender, age, education (measured as number of years in education), occupation (in dummy format), and family 
income (taken as a continuous variable).12  On any account this is an incomplete model specification, 
particularly given the emphasis that the literature is placing on ideology as determined by a shifting and 
evolving political environment (for a review see Torcal and Medina 2002).  Yet we are not interested in the 
partisanship element of ideology.  Much to the contrary, our interest points at the relationship between ideology 
and variables that occur causally at an earlier stage.  In short, when voters locate themselves in the ideological 
continuum, to what extend are they reflecting religious value orientations?13  
 
Table 8 about here 
 
The model performs nicely. It shows a high overall predictive strength (with an R2 of 0.46).  Secondly, most 
of the coefficients included are statistically significant, religiosity being one of them.  At the maximum level of 
                                                          
12 Having found only very weak indirect effects in the Portuguese case, we have decided to limit this exploration to the 
Spanish case.   
 
13 As has been said, the model includes a variable measuring the respondents’ recollection of their mothers’ ideology.  That is 
meant to tap the well-known socialization argument, which sees ideology (and party identification) as the consequence of a 
socialization process taking part within the family.  Previous work in this subject has found that, as far as the transmission of 
ideological views is concerned, the bonds are closer between sons and their mothers, rather than between sons and their 
fathers (Jaime 2000). 
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statistical significance, every transit from the reference category towards higher religiosity pushes the 
respondent towards the right.  Such a result clearly confirms that religiosity and ideology are closely related.  To 
a considerable extent, ideological identities respond to previously conformed religious value orientations.  
Particularly in the case of AP/PP voting in Spain, high levels of religiosity lead voters to rightist ideological 
positions that, in most cases, will represent PP voting.  But the same applies to the choices of non-believers.  
Feelings of disassociation from religion will be converted into leftist ideological positions that, again, suggest 
leftist voting.    
 
The conclusion of this section is twofold. Firstly, in order to capture the true magnitude of the bearing of 
religiosity on party choice, the analysis must go beyond the observation of direct effects.  And secondly, the 
importance of this kind of effects is uneven.  In Portugal, the weakness of religiosity as a predictor of the vote 
does not conceal indirect effects of considerable magnitude.  In Spain, however, religiosity and ideology trace a 
complex interaction that distorts the influence of the former on party choice. 
 
    
Equal but different 
 
In this paper both important similarities as well as striking differences as regards the relationship between 
religion and politics have been identified.  Perhaps the single most important feature that Spain and Portugal has 
in common is that, in spite of a tradition of internecine disputes around religion, the potential for a pervasive 
religious cleavage has never been activated.  In the late 1970s, the social climate in both Portugal and Spain 
contained some potential for pervasive religious conflicts (Gunther and Montero 2001; Montero 1997). This is 
particularly clear in the virulent anti-clericalism associated with the Republican experience in both countries, 
which in part explained their eventual demise and replacement by enduring authoritarian regimes that enjoyed 
Church support.  It could have been perfectly possible for the new political elites to politicise a number of 
religious issues that simply lay dormant.   
 
Religious peace, however, replaced conflict, and the foundations for a softer relationship between 
religiosity and political behaviour were established in both countries already in the late 1970s.  We have 
previously explained the de-activation of religious conflicts during these crucial times in terms of the role of 
political elites as cleavage (de)activators (Montero and Calvo 1999).   As it is commonly known, the impact of 
processes of social change on cleavage consolidation is usually framed by the widely-accepted threefold 
conceptual schema by Bartolini and Mair (1990: 212 ff.).  In terms of the religious cleavage, the most 
immediate impact of social change is said to be the elimination of religious differences at the societal level.  
This blurring of religious divisions at the societal level has, according to this theory, an immediate impact on 
the formation of political identities. As there are no clearly defined religious social groups, religiosity can 
hardly be expected to determine people’s understanding of politics. Consequently, and this brings us to the third 
dimension of this schema, confessional and religious parties (that is, the organisational expression of existing 
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religious divides at the societal level) virtually eliminate their programmatic references to religious issues. This 
strategy eventually explains why these issues have ceased to be an object of confrontation in the partisan arena. 
In short, the erosion of religious subcultures, paralleling the process that affected the traditional working class, 
should lead to party choices being increasingly based on individual preferences rather than on collective 
identifications (Dogan 1996; Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 1995: 225). 
 
Convincing as the threefold sequence appears to be, it says little about the mechanisms that are supposed to 
set these dynamics in motion.  Moreover, in the view of existing assumptions, cleavages are said to solely 
reflect objective interests and identities, implying that the strength of their correlation with individuals’ electoral 
choices is merely a function of particular individuals’ position in the social structure. We, in contrast, believe 
that political agency matters. In more cases than it is usually recognised, given a certain distribution of religious 
traits among the citizenry, political actors (the complex web of organisations, parties, elites, as well as their 
preferences, strategies, exchanges, decisions, discourses) are in a position to shape from above, with differing 
but nonetheless discernible degrees of autonomy, the religious cleavage (Sartori 1969: 89).  Paraphrasing the 
argument originally made by Przeworski and Sprague (1986: 10-11, 143) and developed for the analysis of the 
formation of Christian democratic parties by Kalyvas (1996: 8-9), we claim that the religious conflict is salient 
in a given society if, when, and only to the extent to which it is important to political parties which mobilise 
religious or secular citizens.  During the consolidation of democracy, Portuguese and Spanish elites opted not to 
centre on the religious cleavage. This explains the mild effects of religious voting on the early elections 
considered in this paper.  Using the Portuguese case as an illustration, during the transition period the Church 
was tainted by the association with the authoritarian regime of Salazar, even if the role of Catholic groups in the 
opposition to Salazar partially restored legitimacy. As Pasquino (1990: 49) points out, “Catholics were 
unwilling to engage, qua Catholics, in politics”, and we should add that Catholics leaders were even less willing 
to do so. On the other hand, the religious scab was less fresh than across the border – inter alia, due to the 
length of the Salazarist regime, its aversion to radicalism (which precluded a virulent backlash and reversal of 
the republican project), and notably the relative peaceful demise of the Portuguese First Republic, when 
compared to the Civil War of its Iberian neighbour.  Established as a moribund cleavage, religiosity only but 
receded as an explanatory factor for party choice in both countries during the 1980s.  The religious peace 
insinuated during the transition years evolved into a quasi-structural definition of the political role of religiosity.  
Without any salience in the electoral competition, the soft approach that presided the relationship between the 
Church and the governments in Portugal and Spain simply eliminated the need to think in religious terms at the 
time of casting the vote.  
 
Nevertheless, that religion is prevented from representing a major cleavage does not preclude religiosity 
from influencing party choice in a significant fashion.  In short, religious voting can be found in contexts of 
weak, or even non-existent religious cleavage.  This is the terrain where the comparison between Spain and 
Portugal shines as an illuminating example of the different intensities that religious voting can adopt in context 
of institutional religious peace.  For one, as we have seen, religious voting is more salient in Spain than in 
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Portugal.  With different intensities according to political parties as well as to time points, we have nonetheless 
found a consistently strong association between religiosity and, particularly, conservative voting in Spain.  In 
Portugal, however, neither conservative, nor leftist voting seems to be linked with religion in any meaningful 
way.  To explain   these differences, the founding processes by which the party systems in both countries, as 
well as the initial alliances between voters and parties, should be considered.  Despite the expressed 
determination from both political and religious elites not to politicise religion (Linz 1993), Spanish voters were 
offered a limited range of electoral options (at least narrower than in Portuguese case) that, moreover, could be 
roughly classified along religious terms.  Building on the manifested ties with the recent Francoist past, and 
helped by the ideological and moral profiles of the party’s governing elite, voters could attribute a certain 
religious identities to AP that was different from the one conferred on the PSOE or the Communist Party.   
Portuguese voters, however, faced a more complex task.  Exposed to a much diversified party system built on 
the legacies of the founding revolution , and in a context where the largest political parties only seemed to differ 
in the issue of regime type, the possibility of classifying the PSD and the PS according to religion was largely 
impossible (Jalali 2002; Fishman 2005).  The evolution of political events in both countries are only but 
exacerbating these differences.  Whereas in Spain, a number of policies relating to religious education, moral 
issues or Church-state relations raised the profile of the PP as a morally conservative, religious political party 
(against the morally liberal stance of the PSOE), in Portugal both the PS and the PSD continue to share basic 
views in relation to crucial religious and moral problems. 
 
It is interesting to note that all this has resulted in notorious differences in the religious profiles of the 
different political parties.  According to the data provided in figures 1 and 2, the two largest Portuguese political 
parties soon exhibited very similar religious profiles.  In both cases those that we call “nuclear Catholics” 
represented more than fifty per cent of their voters.  In a country that has systematically ranked among the more 
religious in Europe, the main political parties compete for a very large part of the electorate that, however, is 
largely uniform in religious terms.  A different argument, of course, should be elaborated to explain the choice 
between the large and the extreme Portuguese political parties.  In Spain, however, the religious profiles of AP 
and the PSOE were very different from the onset.  In spite of the fact that in 1982 the PSOE outdid AP in every 
religious category, it was among the more religious where the latter party managed to perform better.  
 
Figures 1 and 2 about here 
  
A second difference between our cases compared relates to the definition and evolution of the triangular 
relationship conformed by religiosity, ideology, and party choice.  One key finding of this analysis is that 
whereas in Portugal ideology does not obstruct the bearing of religiosity on party choice, in Spain it clearly does 
so.  It is the fact that ideology is not obstructing the effect of religiosity what accounts for the absence of 
indirect effects in the Portuguese case.  Tables 9 (Spain) and 10 (Portugal) display three-way contingency tables 
with religiosity, ideology and party choice as variables.  The third and forth columns summarize the voting 
preferences of the different religious groups.  Such basic information reveals again interesting differences 
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between Spain and Portugal.  While in the former case religious voters have adopted more distinctive voting 
intentions as time has passed by, in the latter the irrelevance of religion has become even more apparent: in 
2002, every religious group split evenly between the two large options.  But nothing of the sort has happened in 
the march 2004 general elections in Spain; in this case, nuclear Catholics (around 20 per cent of the total 
population) opted for the PP, while Non-believers (around 40 per cent) preferred the PSOE.  
 
The tables also confirm that religiosity is not bounded to ideology in Portugal in the same way that it is so 
in Spain.  For each of the percentages resulting after cross-tabulating religion and party choice, the table 
displays a distribution according to ideological categories. For instance, the percentages shown in the fourth 
row of Table 9 represent the ideological distribution of those nuclear Catholics that voted for AP in 1982 (28 
per cent), and for the PP in 2004 (40 per cent). We are interested to see whether or not, for each different party, 
the distribution adopts a different shape according to religion.  Should this be the case, we could conclude that 
ideology is closely linked with religion.  Otherwise, the conclusion will be that ideological identities are formed 
regardless religious identities, thus suggesting a definition of ideology free of value orientations.  As expected, 
the contrasts are striking.  While in Portugal ideological distributions for each political party replicate the same 
pattern across the different religious groups, in Spain the shape of this distribution seems to depend highly on 
the degree of religiosity.  An example based on PP voting on 2004 will illustrate the point.  In the case of those 
nuclear Catholics who voted for the PP, ideological conservatism (right and extreme right) amounted to 60 per 
cent of the category.  In contrast, only 47 per cent of those non-believers had voted for the PP were 
ideologically conservative.  Variations of this kind cannot be found in the Portuguese case. 
 
Tables 9 and 10 about here 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Portugal and Spain present an interesting counterpoint in terms of electoral behaviour.  Despite evident 
similarities anchored in history, culture, and geography, these two countries have come to develop different 
scenarios for the development of religious voting.  Indeed, our models seem to challenge the perception of 
Iberian countries as split along religious lines.  In the context of a recently completed transition period, these 
elections took place in an environment were religious conflicts had been deliberately silenced.  Moreover, the 
identification with strong religious identities were also explicitly excluded in the strategies followed by party 
leaders when building ex novo new party systems in both Iberian countries.  Consequently, religious identities 
were doomed to play only a secondary role in the definition of electoral alignments at the beginning of the 
1980s.  All that notwithstanding, our data confirm the existence of a religious voting of considerable strength in 
Spain.  Perhaps without becoming determinant, we have seen that religiosity, particularly in the case of the 
diminishing group of nuclear Catholics, still help voters to opt among political parties.    
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In this paper we have shown that the differences between Spain and Portugal operate at different levels.  On 
the one hand, the different role of religiosity on voting is linked with “substantive” realities, such as diverging 
party systems or distinctive religious maps.  On the other hand, however, we have also found interesting 
“operational” differences in the mechanisms that translate religious identities into party choice. If in Spain, 
ideological identities incorporate value orientations to a great extent, in Portugal the location in the left-right 
scale appears to be less value-dependent.  While a careful examination of why both “left” and “right” means 
different things in different places escapes the limits of this paper, we have come to the conclusion that a great 
deal of the differences between the cases has to do with varying definitions of ideological identities.  In Spain, 
to a considerable extent, religious identities translate into ideological identities.  In Portugal this does not 
happen.  
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Table 1.  Subjective religiosity in Europe,  2002-2003 a 
  
Average 
 
Median 
 
Mode 
Standard 
deviation 
 
N 
      
Greece 7.7 8 10 2.2 2,566 
Poland 6.6 7 8 2.4 2,110 
Italy 6.1 6 6 2.5 1,207 
Ireland 5.8 6 5 2.4 2,046 
Portugal 5.7 6 5 2.5 1,511 
Finland 5.6 6 7 2.6 2,000 
Austria 5.2 5 5 3 2,257 
Switzerland 5.2 5 5 2.8 2,038 
Netherlands 5.1 6 7 2.9 2,364 
Belgium 5.0 5 5 3.0 1,899 
Slovenia 4.9 5 5 2.8 1,519 
Israel 4.7 5 5 3.1 2,499 
Denmark 4.4 5 5 2.5 1,506 
Hungary 4.4 5 5 3.0 1,685 
Spain 4.4 5 5 2.7 1,729 
United Kingdom 4.3 5 5 2.8 2,052 
Germany 4.2 5 0 2.9 2,919 
Luxemburg 4.1 4 0 3.1 1,552 
Norway 4.1 4 5 2.5 2,036 
Sweden 3.7 3 0 2.8 1,999 
Czech Republic 3.1 2 0 2.9 1,360 
      
European Average 5 5 5 2.9 40,574 
 
a  Figures are means in scales of  self-definition of religiosity, where value 0 is “not being religious at all”, and 
value 10 implies being “very religious”. Countries are sorted according to the means. 
 
Source: European Social Survey (ESS), 2002. 
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Table 2. Selected  indicators of religiosity in Spain (1981, 1990, and 1999) and Portugal (1999) (in percentages) 
  Spain Portugal 
Indicator 1981 1990 1999 1999 
Religiosity     
    As a person you are…     
        Religious 63 63 56 82 
        Not religious 30 28 33 14 
        Atheist 4 4 6 3 
    You consider yourself as…     
        Very good catholic + practising catholic 37 30 29 - 
        Not very practising catholic 27 28 28 - 
        Not practising catholic 19 26 25 - 
        Indifferent 10 12 12 - 
        Not believer, atheist 4 4 6 - 
        Other religion 1 1 1 - 
    Importance of religion in your life…     
        A lot of + quite - 54 42 71 
        Little + not any - 45 58 29 
     
    Beliefs     
        Belief in…     
          God 87 81 81 93 
          Life after dead 55 42 40 47 
          Heaven 50 48 42 63 
          Hell 34 27 27 35 
          Sin 58 57 44 73 
    Importance of God (means in scale 1 to 10) 6.39 6.25 5.97 7.53 
    You find comfort and strength thanks to religion 57 53 49 76 
    You have moments of praying and meditation 60 61 61 71 
     
Religious practice     
    Attending to church     
        Once per week or more 41 33 25 40 
        Once per month 12 10 10 12 
        Sometimes 10 17 9 8 
        Never or almost never 36 40 56 40 
     
Church     
    You have confidence in Church     
        A lot of + quite 50 53 41 73 
        No much or none at all 49 47 57 27 
    You think Church is giving proper answers to...     
        Moral and individual problems 39 39 33 58 
        Problems in family life 34 38 29 52 
        Spiritual necessities of the people 45 49 48 69 
        Social problems in the country - 33 23 41 
(N) (2.305) (2.637) (1.200) (1.895) 
 
Sources: For Spain, World Values Surveys (WVS), 1981, 1990, and 1999.  For Portugal, WVS, 1999. 
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Table 3: Frequency of church attendance in Europe, 2002 a (in percentages) 
 
 
Country 
 
At least once a 
week 
 
At least once a 
month 
 
Occasionally 
 
Almost never or 
never 
     
Poland 56 19 17 8 
Ireland 54 13 10 23 
     
Italy 31 12 20 37 
Portugal 29 15 8 48 
Greece 27 28 28 16 
Spain 21 9 17 53 
Slovenia 20 10 31 39 
     
Israel 19 7 27 47 
Austria 18 15 19 48 
Luxembourg 15 10 17 58 
United Kingdom 13 6 12 68 
Netherlands 12 9 13 66 
Switzerland 11 12 27 50 
Hungary 11 7 22 59 
Belgium 11 8 15 66 
     
Czech Republic 9 5 16 70 
Germany 8 10 21 60 
Norway 5 6 24 65 
Sweden 5 6 17 72 
Finland 5 7 25 64 
Denmark 3 7 21 69 
     
Total 18 11 20 51 
 
a The question is as follows: “Apart from special occasions, such as weddings and funerals, about how often do 
you attend religious services nowadays? Every day; More than once a week; Once a week; At least once a month; 
Only on special holy days; Less often; Never”. Countries are ordered by the highest frequency. 
 
Source: ESS, 2002. 
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Table  4:  Logistic regressions to explain party vote in Spain, 1982a 
 Model A: With ideology Model B: Without ideology 
Variables Vote PSOE Vote AP Vote PSOE Vote AP 
Religious attendance (RC: Not very practising 
Catholics)     
Atheist -0.4299* -2.5264*** 0.3682 -2.7601*** 
 (0.2573) (0.8576) (0.2483) (0.7008) 
Indifferent 0.5403** -1.2621** 1.0482*** -1.7279*** 
 (0.1911) (0.5625) (0.1784) (0.4584) 
Not practising Catholics 0.1310 -0.4838 0.3917*** -0.7039*** 
 (0.1542) (0.3809) (0.1471) (0.2676) 
Practising Catholics -0.7101*** 0.2824 -0.8921*** 0.7558*** 
 (0.1495) (0.3017) (0.1421) (0.2221) 
Very good Catholics -0.9271*** -0.7859 -1.2933*** 0.4538 
 (0.2799) (0.5388) (0.2577) (0.3270) 
Attitudes towards abortion -0.1225 0.6790*** -0.0966 0.7075*** 
 (0.1091) (0.2490) (0.1029) (0.1824) 
Ideology -4.3837*** 13.4816***   
 (0.3828) (1.1561)   
Manuel Fraga’s  (AP) thermometer  7.6804***  9.5461*** 
  (0.7218)  (0.5889) 
Felipe Gonzalez’s  (PSOE)  7.6053***  7.8633***  
 (0.3767)  (0.3555)  
Governmental performance 0.3449* -0.6002 0.4554*** -0.8379** 
 (0.1916) (0.4357) (0.1767) (0.3385) 
Occupational status (RC: Employed)     
Retired -0.6317** 0.1190 -0.4330* -0.1653 
 (0.2785) (0.6497) (0.2642) (0.4146) 
Unemployed -0.4165* -0.1685 -0.2091 -0.5200 
 (0.2181) (0.5958) (0.2094) (0.4446) 
Student -0.1457 -0.1534 -0.0192 -0.1299 
 (0.2036) (0.4347) (0.1910) (0.3227) 
Housewife 0.1947 0.0624 0.2705 0.0419 
 (0.1861) (0.3988) (0.1723) (0.2933) 
Family income (RC: Up to 10,000 ptas.)     
10,001-20,000 ptas. -2.0060*** 0.4197 -2.0467*** 2.4033* 
 (0.6665) (1.1060) (0.6582) (1.3071) 
20,001-30,000 ptas. -2.6796*** 0.2084 -2.6369*** 2.0545* 
 (0.6058) (0.8293) (0.6166) (1.2229) 
30,001-50,000 ptas. -2.4396*** 0.3904 -2.4682*** 2.0702* 
 0.5854) (0.8014) (0.5995) (1.2157) 
50,001-70,000 ptas. -2.8763*** 0.6406 -2.9024*** 2.4477** 
 (0.5870) (0.7883) (0.6006) (1.2146) 
70,001 –100,000 ptas. -3.6230*** 0.7152 -3.6181*** 2.7004** 
 (0.5961) (0.8149) (0.6069) (1.2316) 
100,000 – 250,000 ptas. -3.8277*** 0.9340 -3.9168*** 2.9970** 
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 (0.6031) (0.8365) (0.6147) (1.2447) 
More than 250,000 ptas. -3.3927*** 2.2570 -3.7737*** 4.3648*** 
 (0.7122) (1.4292) (0.7477) (1.3633) 
Education (RC: Primary school)     
Secondary education -0.4601*** 0.8502*** -0.4559*** 0.8872*** 
 (0.1470) (0.3163) (0.1374) (0.2302) 
University (undergraduates) -0.6415*** 1.1362** -0.6625*** 1.1378*** 
 (0.2244) (0.4853) (0.2095) (0.3705) 
University (postgraduates) -0.3322 0.3252 -0.4450** 0.5585 
 (0.2387) (0.5355) (0.2215) (0.4090) 
Gender (RC: female) 0.0795 0.6989** 0.1039 0.5882** 
 (0.1526) (0.3356) (0.1416) (0.2521) 
Age (RC: 18-36 years)     
37-41 -0.2229 0.0928 -0.3437* 0.1364 
 (0.1976) (0.4583) (0.1921) (0.3312) 
42-51 -0.2235 0.2666 -0.3031** 0.5562** 
 (0.1663) (0.3629) (0.1579) (0.2518) 
52-66 -0.3584** 0.4917 -0.4778*** 0.7056** 
 (0.1764) (0.3735) (0.1671) (0.2828) 
More than 67 years -0.4438 0.0049 -0.6671** 0.5952 
 (0.2884) (0.7184) (0.2766) (0.4465) 
Community size 0.0651*** -0.0811 0.0710*** -0.0088 
 (0.0251) (0.0595) (0.0237) (0.0450) 
Intercept 0.3058 -14.7033*** -1.9394*** -10.7755*** 
 (0.6822) (1.2128) (0.6589) (1.3454) 
     
Number of cases 2,851 2,106 2,900 2,146 
Prob. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.45 0.79 0.40 0.65 
Log likelihood -1089.99 -248.64 -1197.82 -423.50 
Correctly classified (in %) 83.76 95.44 82.00 92.64 
 
a Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Levels of statistical significance are ***at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%. 
 
Source: DATA survey, 1982  
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Table 5: Logistic regressions to explain party vote in Portugal, 1983 a 
 Model A: With Ideology Model B: Without Ideology 
Variables Vote PS Vote PSD Vote PS Vote PSD 
Religious attendance (RC: Two times per month)     
      Never 0.7926* 0.8688 1.023*** -0.0410 
 (0.4630) (0.6305) (0.328) (0.4907) 
Sometimes 0.2549 0.1358 0.1625 0.0662 
 (0.4326) (0.6045) (0.3399) (0.4535) 
Every Sunday -0.6219 1.0475* -1.3372 0.8584* 
 (0.4015) (0.5963) (0.3314) (0.4623) 
More than once per week -0.7054 2.0330*** -0.7858 2.0067*** 
 (0.6129) (0.8029) (0.5415) (0.7493) 
Ideology -6.8926*** 8.2448***   
 (1.2045) (1.3714)   
Rui Machete’s (PSD) thermometer  2.8327***  3.2250*** 
  (0.7605)  (0.6144) 
Mario Soare’s (PS) thermometer 5.0089***  4.3767***  
 (0.6733)  (0.522)  
Occupational status (RC: Self-employed)     
Employed 1.1357*** -0.8528 0.9917*** -1.1578*** 
 (0.4403) (0.5392) (0.383) (0.452) 
Unemployed 1.7595** -1.6615 1.2369* -1.4069 
 (0.7334) (1.0333) (0.661) (0.902) 
Retired 1.4146** -0.4128 1.2826*** -0.6077 
 (0.622) (0.6686) (0.498) (0.593) 
Student 1.2130 -0.1199 0.5214 0.5840 
 (0.9469) (1.1392) (0.754) (0.822) 
Housewife 1.4039*** -1.1065 1.0547** -1.0943** 
 (0.5360) (0.6772) (0.423) (0.518) 
Family income (RC: Less than 20.000 escudos)     
20,000-29,999 escudos 0.5004 -0.2657 0.5216 -0.1611 
 (0.5202) (0.5998) (0.400) (0.551) 
30,000-39,999 e. -0.4342 0.7069 -0.1907 0.6179 
 (0.557) (0.5787) (0.384) (0.525) 
40,000-49,999 e. -0.5789 0.1026 -0.6259 0.5314 
 (0.599) (0.5925) (0.445) (0.546) 
50,000-59,999 e. -0.6653 0.8017 -0.5075 0.9522* 
 (0.605) (0.6307) (0.469) (0.561) 
60,000-69,999 e. -1.3695** 0.4875 -1.3229** 0.7224 
 (0.714) (0.8792) (0.543) (0.645) 
79,999 e. -1.1893 1.5110 -0.8898 1.1437 
 (0.747) (0.9882) (0.619) (0.903) 
Education (RC: Primary school)     
Professional training -0.8572 n.d. -0.7644 n.d. 
 (0.729)  (0.759)  
Secondary school -0.8181** -0.3706 -0.6735* -0.3748 
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 (0.375) (0.4920) (0.353) (0.392) 
University -2.4130*** 0.7217 -1.7621*** 0.4968 
 (0.596) (0.7175) (0.509) (0.588) 
Gender (RC: Female) -0.1001 0.1135 -0.2826 0.4228 
 (0.364) (0.4715) (0.288) (0.386) 
Age (RC: 18-36 years)     
31-45 -0.4252 0.1165 -0.4552 -0.0827 
 (0.419) (0.4889) (0.351) (0.384) 
46-65 -0.2608 -0.2542 -0.2304 -0.5178 
 (0.412) (0.5684) (0.359) (0.439) 
More than 65 years -0.9528 0.6825 -1.1027** 0.1885 
 (0.599) (0.7507) (0.497) (0.656) 
Community size -0.0650 0.3648** -0.1084 0.2641** 
 (0.140) (0.1624) (0.1078) (0.1367) 
Intercept 2.2957** -7.7827*** -1.3607** -2.7400*** 
 (0.9370) (1.3115) (0.6924) (0.8232) 
 
Number of cases  457 335 531 358 
Prob. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.41 0.39 0.25 0.19 
Log likelihood -175.27 -127.80 -256.24 -179.06 
Correctly classified (in %) 83.81 85.07 74,95 76,54 
a Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Levels of statistical significance are ***at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%. 
 
Sources: The Four Nation Study, 1985. 
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Table 6: Logistic regressions for explaining party vote in Spain, 2004 a 
 Model A: With ideology Model B: Without ideology 
 Vote PP Vote PSOE Vote PP Vote PSOE 
Religious attendance (RC: Never)      
With less frequency 1.1691* -0.0984 1.2953*** -0.1985 
 (0.7170) (0.2982) (0.4768) (0.2452) 
Just in special religious celebrations 1.9472*** 0.1117 2.0659*** -0.0585 
 (0.6814) (0.2698) (0.4814) (0.2367) 
At least once per month 0.7711 -0.3307 1.9053*** -0.6233** 
 (0.8375) (0.3720) (0.5452) (0.3224) 
Once per week 1.6476** -0.9617*** 1.8492*** -1.1301*** 
 (0.7552) (0.3594) (0.5487) (0.3000) 
More than once per week 2.2026** -0.5868 2.4462*** -1.1184** 
 (0.9777) (0.5753) (0.7875) (0.5253) 
Attitudes towards abortion -1.7930** 0.1543 -2.1464*** 0.4013 
 (0.9139) (0.3855) (0.6002) (0.3331) 
Ideology 12.8934 -4.3564***   
 (2.0479) (0.6955)   
José L. Rdz. Zapatero’s (PSOE) thermometer  6.9745***  7.5044*** 
  (0.6516)  (0.5887) 
Mariano Rajoy’s (PP) thermometer 8.8716***  9.9116***  
 (1.0053)  (0.9748)  
Economic performance -2.8272*** 0.4380*** -2.6900*** 0.5887*** 
 (0.4303) (0.1448) (0.3901) (0.1191) 
Occupational status (RC: Self-employed)     
Retired 0.6483 -0.1032 0.6856 -0.1054 
 (0.7553) (0.3773) (0.5244) (0.3387) 
Unemployed -1.2206 0.0804 -0.9665 0.2332 
 (0.8696) (0.4947) (0.7398) (0.4189) 
Student -2.9846 0.6074 -0.9254 0.6627 
 (1.6989)* (0.5899) (1.0589) (0.5016) 
Housewife 0.5350 0.3313 0.3649 0.4692* 
 (0.5537) (0.3144) (0.4570) (0.2787) 
Family income (RC: Less than 600 Euros)      
600-900 Euros -0.4498 -0.1551 -0.2604 -0.3174 
 (0.7989) (0.3624) (0.5290) (0.3158) 
900-1,500 Euros -0.6816 -0.3120 -0.1846 -0.2884 
 (0.8004) (0.3620) (0.5162) (0.3134) 
1,500-2,100 Euros -0.0714 -0.5041 -0.1010 -0.3388 
 (0.8807) (0.3908) (0.5976) (0.3414) 
2,100-2,700 Euros 1.2241 -1.9925** 1.3502* -0.8323** 
 (0.9911) (0.4524) (0.7269) (0.3945) 
More than 2,700 Euros -0.7680 -0.2982 0.7350 -0.3145 
 (1.1248) (0.8060) (0.9442) (0.6346) 
Education (RC: Primary school)     
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Secondary school and professional training -0.2117 -0.0151 -0.1220 -0.1525 
 (0.4925 (0.2540) (0.4186) (0.2275 
University (3 years) -0.3868 -0.1237 -0.1557 -0.1485 
 (1.0254) (0.5471) (1.2335) (0.5475) 
University (4 or more years) 0.6030 -0.9026*** 0.3046 -0.8055*** 
 (0.6043) (0.2855) (0.5434) (0.2455) 
Gender f 0.8779** -0.1996 0.7038* -0.1198 
 (0.4365) (0.2329) (0.3787) (0.1971) 
Age (RC: Female)      
37-41 1.8287*** 0.0957 1.1358** 0.0958 
 (0.6386) (0.3276) (0.4871) (0.2904) 
42-51 0.2739 -0.2980 0.2735 -0.2183 
 (0.6214) (0.2752) (0.4888 (0.2401) 
52-66 0.3560 0.0423 -0.0093 -0.1156 
 (0.6651) (0.3062) (0.4438) (0.2771) 
67-81 -1.0854 0.0831 -1.0107* -0.0050 
 (0.8974) (0.4307) (0.6263) (0.3790 
More than 81 years 1.7257** -0.7297 1.5276* -1.3087* 
 (0.7883) (0.7962) (0.8845) (0.7304) 
Community size 0.0254 -0.0276 0.1008 -0.0461 
 (0.1382) (0.0627) (0.1036) (0.0546) 
Intercept -6.9775*** -2.3014*** -1.2933 -5.0911*** 
 (1.6626) (0.8707) (1.1844) (0.6396) 
 
Number of cases 859 971 955 1,100 
Prob. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.79 0.43 0.68 0.36 
Log likelihood -113.36 -376.23 -176.80 -476.07 
Correctly classified (in %) 95.23 82.70 91.83 79.73 
a Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Levels of statistical significance are ***at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%. 
 
Source: TNS/Demoscopia survey, 2004. 
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Table 7: Logistic regression explaining party vote in Portugal, 2002 a 
 Model A: With ideology Model B: Without ideology 
Variables Vote PSD Vote PS Vote PSD Vote PS 
Religious attendance (RC: Never)     
One per year -0.7458 0.1630 -0.5598 0.1367 
 (0.7180) (0.8366) (0.7054) (0.6865) 
Two to eleven times per year -0.3518 -0.2132 -0.4377 0.1022 
 (0.6413) (0.7077) (0.6902) (0.5826) 
Once per month 0.6947 -1.0312 0.7725 -0.8973 
 (0.7604) (0.8163) (0.7289) (0.6887) 
Two or more times per month -0.4189 -0.2760 -0.2706 0.0978 
 (0.7179) (0.7826) (0.7361) (0.6639) 
Once per week or more -0.3829 -0.2616 -0.0660 -0.2792 
 (0.7301) (0.7902) (0.7291) (0.6379) 
Attitudes towards abortion -0.4507 -0.0644 -0.3581 -0.0667 
 (0.5825) (0.5290) (0.4881) (0.4862) 
Ideology 5.1656*** -5.953***   
 (1.2768) (1.0689)   
José M. Durâo Barroso’s (PSD) thermometer 0.6163***  0.7056***  
 (0.0807)  (0.0786)  
Ferro Rodrigues’ (PS) thermometer  0.5415***  0.5886*** 
  (0.0892)  (0.0757) 
Government performance 1.1239*** -0.9527*** 1.2159*** -1.0869*** 
 (0.2838) (0.3651) (0.2758) (0.3190) 
Occupational status (RC: Self-employed)     
Unemployed 0.7538 -0.1549 0.7797 -0.2499 
 (0.9063) (0.9893) (0.7015) (0.7802) 
Student -0.2183 -0.0900 -0.2006 0.0421 
 (0.9194) (0.7682) (0.9727) (0.9190) 
Retired -0.3144 0.1539 -0.2188 0.1191 
 (0.7702) (0.5811) (0.7303) (0.4892) 
Housewife -0.6598 0.0408 -0.2071 -0.0805 
 (0.5859) (0.5067) (0.5677) (0.4687) 
Family income (RC: Less than 300 Euros)     
301-750 Euros 0.5663 -0.1230 0.0569 0.0803 
 (0.7798) (0.6885) (0.7300) (0.4677) 
751-1,500 Euros 0.7612 -0.5524 0.3295 -0.4074 
 (0.8066) (0.6772) (0.7510) (0.5087) 
1,501-2,500 Euros 0.7800 0.0267 0.5652 0.1035 
 (0.8008) (0.8336) (0.7550) (0.6625) 
More than 2,500 Euros 0.8497 -0.7379 0.8799 -0.6076 
 (1.1569) (1.0737) (0.9999) (0.7693) 
Education (RC: Primary school)     
Basic level completed -0.3184 0.3080 0.1352 0.1319 
 (0.5370) (0.5053) (0.4714) (0.4435) 
Secondary school 0.8220 -0.9618** 1.0740** -0.9087* 
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 (0.5720) (0.5266) (0.4749) (0.4766) 
University -0.0186 -0.3750 0.2431 -0.4224 
 (0.6352) (0.6218) (0.5758) (0.5858) 
Gender (RC: Female) -0.3119 -0.0546 -0.3205 -0.0236 
 (0.3947) (0.3756) (0.3484) (0.3310) 
Age (RC: 18-36 years)     
31-45 1.0712** -0.6596 0.8233** -0.5928 
 (0.5375) (0.4936) (0.4285) (0.4862) 
46-65 1.6338*** -1.0990* 1.5415*** -0.9726* 
 (0.6178) (0.5456) (0.5609) (0.5346) 
More than 65 years 1.1983 -1.3495* 0.8763 -1.2381* 
 (0.9594) (0.8114) (0.8319) (0.6633) 
Community size -0.0796 0.0599 -0.0700 0.0882 
 (0.0875) (0.0781) (0.0809) (0.0675) 
Intercept 10.1787*** 4.0077** -8.6096*** 0.3803 
 (1.8382) (1.7189) (1.4500) (1.2999) 
     
Number of cases  377 370 395 386 
Prob. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.56 0.49 0.49 0.38 
Log likelihood -115.22 -128.93 -139.53 -165.01 
Correctly classified (in %) 87.80 86.22 86.08 82.64 
 
a Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Levels of statistical significance are ***at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%. 
 
Source: Instituto de Ciências Sociais (ICS) survey, 2002. 
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Table 8: Regression linear model to explain ideology in Spain, 2002 a 
 Ideology 
 Coefficients (Standard errors) 
Mother´s ideology 
 
Religious attendance (RC: Non-believer) 
 
Almost never 
Sometimes a year 
Sometimes a month 
Almost every Sunday 
More than once a week 
 
Occupation (RC: Worker) 
 
Pensionist 
Unemployed 
Student 
Housewife 
 
 
Family income 
 
Education 
 
Age 
 
Gender 
 
Constant 
5.2343*** 
 
 
 
0.6662*** 
1.0612*** 
1.0433*** 
1.3436*** 
1.9716*** 
 
 
 
0.3913*** 
-0.1527 
-0.0615 
0.1974* 
 
 
0.0178 
 
-0.0907*** 
 
-0.0132*** 
 
0.0910 
 
1.9638*** 
 
 (0.2215) 
 
  
 
(0.1030) 
(0.1174) 
(0.1404) 
(0.1296) 
(0.2629) 
 
 
 
(0.1360) 
(0.1262) 
(0.1162) 
(0.1060) 
  
 
(0.0251) 
 
 (0.0249) 
  
(0.0031) 
 
 (0.0740) 
 
(0.2137) 
  
Number of cases  
F 
Prob>F 
R2 
1,848 
92.76 
0.00 
0.46 
a Levels of significance are ***at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% . 
 
Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) # 2,384, 2002. 
 Table 9.  Spain, 1982 and 2004: Religiosity, party choice, and ideology  (in horizontal percentages) 
    
Ideology b 
Religiosity a 
 Total Left Center-left Center 1 Center 2 Center-
right Right 
Vote 1982 2004 1982 2004 1982 2004 1982 2004 1982 2004 1982 2004 1982 2004 
AP-PP 28 40 -- 1 1 2 6 18 14 18 64 44 14 16 
UCD-CDS c 10  --  3  44  29  23  2  
PSOE 29 33 6 7 47 52 35 31 7 6 4 3 -- 1 
Nuclear Catholic 
PCE-IU 1 2 70 28 20 71 10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
                
                
                
AP-PP 16 21 -- -- 2 1 13 24 16 27 59 40 10 8 
UCD-CDS 6  --  11  40  38  11  --  
PSOE 56 47 9 14 64 58 21 22 3 3 2 2 -- -- Nominal Catholic 
PCE-IU 1 4 50 34 37 54 12 10 -- -- -- -- -- 2 
                
                
                
AP-PP 5 8 1 -- 5 7 7 25 26 21 54 27 7 20 
UCD-CDS 2  --  28  53  17  --  3  
PSOE 53 47 15 22 68 57 13 16 2 4 1 -- -- 1 Non-believer 
PCE-IU 6 9 67 39 29 52 4 5 -- 2 -- -- -- 2 
 
a
 This is a three-way table. Religiosity has been grouped into three basic categories: Nuclear Catholics, Nominal Catholics and Non-believers.  For Spain 1982, Nuclear Catholics are those who consider themselves either as “very 
good Catholics” or as “Practising Catholics”; Nominal Catholics are those who feel themselves to be “not very practising Catholics”.  Lastly, Non-believers are those who are “not practising”, “indifferent” or “atheists”. For Spain 
2004, the Nuclear Catholics category is formed by those attending to church either “every day”, “more than once a week” or “once a week”; Nominal Catholics and those who attend to church “once a month”, “just in special religious 
celebrations” or “less frequency”; lastly, Non-believers are those who “never” attend to church.  
 
b   Left represents those individuals located at values 1 and 2 in the self-placement scale;  Center-left corresponds with values 3 and 4; Center-1 corresponds with value 5; Center-2 with value 6; Center-right with values 7 and 8, and 
Right with points 9 and 10. 
 
c  Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) and Centro Democrático y Social (CDS) only for 1982.  
 
Sources: DATA survey, 1982,  and TNS/Demoscopia survey, 2004.. 
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Table 10.  Portugal, 1983 and 2002: Religiosity, party choice, and ideology (in horizontal percentages) 
   
Ideology b 
Religiosity a 
 Total Extreme left Left Center-left Center  Center-right Right Extreme 
right 
Vote 1983 2002 1983 2002 1983 2002 1983 2002 2002 1983 2002 1983 2002 1982 2002 
APU/BE c 4 3 46 17 31 -- 15 33 50 8 -- -- -- -- -- 
PS 48 37 3 5 12 19 47 13 42 19 5 9 9 9 5 
PSD 31 46 -- -- 3 3 16 -- 15 25 8 40 41 17 31 
Nuclear 
Catholic 
CDS d 16 13 2 -- -- 4 10 -- 8 14 11 42 35 32 42 
                 
                 
                 
APU/BE c 19 9 33 28 51 30 10 19 16 4 3 1 3 -- -- 
PS 51 44 4 5 18 15 43 32 30 20 8 11 5 4 4 
PSD 21 42 -- 1 2 1 20 1 22 34 16 32 45 12 13 
Nominal 
Catholic 
CDS d 9 5 -- -- 6 6 11 -- 31 8 -- 57 25 17 37 
                 
                 
                 
APU/BE c 32 16 42 48 37 30 15 9 9 2 4 2 -- 1 -- 
PS 44 42 8 5 24 17 50 33 29 13 5 1 9 3 2 
PSD 18 37 -- -- 2 2 17 2 16 45 18 28 53 8 10 Non-believer 
CDS d 5 5 -- -- 7 -- -- -- 28 20 -- 47 28 27 
43 
 
 
a  This is a three-way table. For Portugal 1983, Nuclear Catholics are those who attend to church “more than once a week” and “every Sunday”; Nuclear Catholics, “two times a month” and “sometimes”; and Non -believers are those 
who “never” attend to church”. For Portugal 2002, Nuclear Catholics attend to church “once a week or more”; Nominal Catholics grouped those who attend to church “two or more times a month”, “once a month” and “two to eleven 
times a year”; finally the category Non-believers are those who attend to church “once a year” or “never”. 
 
b
 For Portugal 1983, Ideology is constructed in the same way that for Spain. However, for Portugal 2002 there are slightly differences because the original self-placement variable has 11 values ranging from 0 to 10 and being the 5 
value the modal. For that reason, we have introduced a new category called Center for this particular location. Thus, this variable remains as follows: 0-1, Extreme left;  2-3, Left;  4, Center-left;  5,  Center; 6, Center-right; 7-8, Right; 
9-10, Extreme right. 
 
c  For the 1983 elections, Aliança Povo Unido (APU) was an electoral coalition including the Movimento Democrático Português (MDP) and the Partido Comunista Português (PCP). For 2002, the Bloco de Esquerda, a new leftist 
party far away from PCP, ran together in coalition with the communists. 
 
d  Centro Democrático Social (CDS), the most conservative party in Portugal, also formed an electoral coalition with other smaller conservative and rightist parties in the 2002’s elections. 
 
Sources: Four Nations Study, 1985, and ICS survey, 2002. 
 
 
Sources: Four Nations Survey, 1985, WVS 1990 and 1999, and TNS/Demoscopia survey, 2004. 
 
Figure 5. Religiosity and Party Support in Spain, 1983-2004
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Figure 1. Religiosity and Party Support in Spain, 1983-2004 
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 Sources: Four Nations Survey 1985, WVS 1990 and 1999, and ICS survey, 2002. 
Figure 5. Religiosity and Party Support in Portugal, 1983-2002
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